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In this study, we addressed whether victim impact instructions served as a legal 
safeguard in a capital case involving victim impact testimony. We hypothesized that 
specific victim impact instructions would moderate the relation between victim impact 
testimony and death penalty recommendations. One hundred sixty-six participants 
viewed a simulated videotaped trial in which a victim impact statement was delivered in 
different emotional conditions. Judge’s instructions were varied as either general 
instructions or with the addition of specific victim impact instructions. Participant-jurors 
who heard specific victim impact instructions were less likely to recommend death 
compared to participants who heard general jury instructions. The value of victim impact 
instructions as a legal safeguard in capital trials is discussed.  
 
 
  The victims’ rights movement has gained tremendous 
momentum in recent years (Henderson, 1985).  The force behind 
the movement was the contention that the criminal justice system 
was insensitive to the harm victims experienced.  Traditionally, 
victims have been denied a formal role in the judicial process.  
Supporters of the movement insisted that the law provide victims a 
meaningful role in criminal proceedings.  As a result, statutes were 
passed that allowed victims a greater degree of participation in the 
justice process.    
 
  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Judith Platania, 
Roger Williams University, One Old Ferry Road, Bristol, RI 02809, email: 
jplatania@rwu.edu . 
 
  
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2006, 2(2) 
 
PLATANIA & BERMAN  85 
The Victim and Witness Protection Act (1982) enacted by 
Congress, requires the inclusion of victim impact statements as 
part of the pre-sentence report submitted to the sentencing 
authority.  The Uniform Victims of Crime Act (1992) provides 
victims with a Constitutional right to be present at court 
proceedings.   In general, victim impact statement legislation 
permits family members of the victim the right to inform the 
sentencer of the crime’s impact on their lives.  This type of 
evidence can include oral or written statements addressing personal 
characteristics of the victim as well as the emotional and financial 
impact of the victim’s death on the family. 
 
The constitutionality of victim impact evidence has been 
consistently called into question. Supporters feel that participation 
in court proceedings helps victims reclaim a sense of dignity 
(Mulholland, 1995; Monzo, 1990).  To them, victim impact 
evidence more efficiently balances punishment with harm caused 
by the crime.  Opponents express concern that victim impact 
evidence invites jurors to base their sentencing decisions on the 
victim’s character rather than evidence or the relevant criminal 
circumstances (Stevens, 2000; Phillips, 1997).  Regardless of one’s 
position on this issue, the emotional nature of victim impact 
testimony raises a troubling question: Does the admissibility of 
victim impact evidence serve the psychological needs of victims’ 
families or assist the jury in arriving at the most appropriate 
sentence?  
 
The Supreme Court decision that allowed the introduction 
of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing hearings was 
Payne v. Tennessee (1991).  In Payne, the victim and her two-year 
old daughter were murdered; her three-year old son survived.  
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the son’s grandmother 
told the jury how the murders had affected him.  Specifically, she 
spoke of how he constantly cries for his mother and sister: 
 
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to 
understand why she doesn’t come home. And he 
cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many 
times during the week and asks me, Grandma do 
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you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m 
worried about my Lacie (p. 815).   
 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor implied that proper justice 
for the victim’s son was for the jury to impose the death penalty: 
 
The people who loved little Lacie Jo, the 
grandparents who are still here. The brother who 
mourns for her every single day and wants to know 
where his best little playmate is. He doesn't have 
anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. 
These are the things that go into why it is especially 
cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that that 
child will carry forever (p. 816).   
 
In Payne, the Court overruled two prior decisions 
addressing victim impact testimony (Booth v. Maryland, 1987; 
South Carolina v. Gathers, 1989). The Payne Court ruled that the 
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit admission of victim impact 
evidence and related prosecutorial argument at the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial.  The Court specifically stated that evidence 
and argument relating to the victim's personal characteristics and 
the impact of the victim's death on surviving family members were 
legitimate means of informing the sentencer about the specific 
harm caused by the defendant's actions.  Further, the Court 
suggested that when admission of such evidence was unfairly 
prejudicial, the defendant might obtain relief under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause.  Since the Payne decision, all 
states allow victim impact statements taken from the victim in non-
capital trials, and most states allow victim impact statements from 
a victim’s family during the sentencing phase of capital trials 
(Field, 1991). 
 
The crimes committed in Payne, Gathers, and Booth shared 
one commonality: each was a vicious attack against innocent, 
vulnerable victims.  Additionally, in each case, the surviving 
family members actively sought the death penalty for the 
defendant (Stevens, 2000).  The victim impact statements delivered 
in all three cases conveyed a heightened sense of emotionality, 
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enhancing the possibility of the maximum allowable sentence 
(Vital, 1994). The statements included well-articulated “good 
character” comments by the surviving family members as well as 
the prosecuting attorneys.  The criminal culpability of each 
defendant was overshadowed by the harm caused to the family by 
the crime.   
 
Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976), the procedural method used to safeguard the 
capital defendant against “arbitrary and capricious” decisions has 
been judicial instructions. When deciding the sentence for a 
defendant who has been found guilty, jurors in most states are 
asked to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the 
case. Aggravating factors are any relevant circumstances, 
supported by the evidence presented during the trial that makes the 
harshest penalty appropriate in the judgment of the jurors. 
Mitigating factors are any evidence presented regarding the 
defendant's character or the circumstances of the crime, which 
would cause a juror to vote for a lesser sentence. Each state has its 
own laws regarding how jurors are instructed to weigh aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. In order to sentence a defendant to 
death, a jury must return a unanimous decision.  
 
While the court in Payne opened the door to victim impact 
evidence, they failed to set forth any specific guidelines on how 
this evidence should be used at the capital trial (Kreitzberg, 1998). 
The dissenting justices were gravely concerned that a jury’s 
“unguided consideration” (p. 861) of victim impact evidence 
would lead to an increase in death penalty verdicts. In the absence 
of specific guidelines, the Payne Court placed the burden on 
individual states to decide how this evidence should be used in a 
capital trial. In New Jersey, the Supreme Court placed restrictions 
on the statute allowing victim impact testimony in a capital murder 
trial (State v. Muhammed, 1996). Specifically, the Court ruled that 
the victim impact testimony be limited to one family member, be 
pre-approved by the trial court, be in written form, and not include 
any opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the sentence that 
should be imposed (Castellano, 1996).  Results of social science 
research (McGowan & Myers, 2004; see also Luginbuhl & 
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Burkhead, 1995; Myers & Arbuthnot, 1999; Myers, Lynn, & 
Arbuthnot, 2002) concur with the Court in Muhammed. Studies 
reveal that participant-jurors are considerably influenced by 
information about the suffering of the victim and the victim’s 
family. In both videotaped trial simulations and transcript 
summaries, death penalty recommendations increased in the 
presence of victim impact evidence. In addition, Greene, Koehring, 
and Quiat (1998) found individuals rendered more severe 
judgments when the victim was portrayed as a highly regarded 
member of the community. This result is not limited to statements 
made by surviving family members or coworkers of the victim. 
Participant-jurors exposed to statements made by the prosecutor 
detailing the effect of the crime on the victim’s family, were 
significantly more likely to vote for the death penalty compared to 
those not exposed (Platania & Moran, 1999). These findings 
support the argument that direct exposure to victim impact 
testimony or through closing arguments can overwhelm the jury’s 
ability to reach a sentencing decision based on reason. When 
adhered to, the above-mentioned restrictions can minimize the risk 
that sentencing decisions are the result of emotion rather than 
reason. However, despite the Court’s efforts to limit the victim 
impact testimony in U.S. v. McVeigh (1997), witness statements 
were gripping: at times moving jurors to tears (Burr, 2003). The 
magnitude of this case has raised defense attorneys’ awareness of 
the unlikelihood of limiting or excluding victim impact testimony.  
 
Some states, however, utilize cautionary instructions in 
capital cases when victim impact evidence is introduced (Turner v. 
State, 1997; Cargle v. State, 1995).  Defense attorneys believe 
detailed instructions have the potential to serve as an effective 
procedural safeguard: protecting the defendant from “arbitrary and 
capricious actions” on the part of the sentencer (Adams, 2003). 
However, research finds that jurors lack a general understanding of 
the function and application of judge’s instructions in death 
penalty studies (Haney & Lynch, 1994; Luginbuhl & Howe, 1995). 
In order for victim impact instructions to be an effective safeguard, 
they must not be confusing to capital jurors.  One example of 
victim impact instructions follows:  
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The prosecution has introduced what is known as 
victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence is 
not the same as evidence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance. Introduction of victim impact 
evidence does not relieve the state of its burden to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance. This evidence is 
simply another method of informing you about the 
harm caused by the crime in question. To the extent 
that you find that this evidence reflects on the 
defendant's culpability, you may consider it, but you 
may not use it as a substitute for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the existence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance and limit the scope of the 
evidence presented (Turner v. State, 1997, p. 843). 
 
This instruction guides jurors to a clear understanding of the role 
of victim impact testimony in sentencing decisions. However, the 
differential impact of judicial instructions in capital trials involving 
victim impact statements has not been established.  
 
The present study addressed whether victim impact 
instructions act as a legal safeguard in a capital case involving 
victim impact testimony. Specifically, we examined the effect of 
varying levels of emotional victim impact testimony and judge’s 
instructions on sentencing recommendations.  We hypothesized 
that specific victim impact instructions (similar to the instructions 
in Turner) would moderate the relation between victim impact 
testimony and death penalty recommendations. In addition, we 
predicted a moderating effect of specific instructions on 
participants’ perceptions of the victim impact statement. Finally, 
we examined differences in sentencing recommendations as a 
function of attitudes toward the victim and defendant.   
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 166 participants (72 males, 94 
females) who were students from general education or introductory 
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psychology classes attending a northeastern university.  
Participants were predominantly Caucasian (97%) between the 
ages of 18 to 24. Seventy-six percent considered themselves either 
slightly liberal or liberal compared to 24% of the sample who rated 
themselves as slightly conservative or conservative.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions.  
 
Materials 
The videotaped trial was based on an actual transcript from 
the murder trial of William Anthony Brooks (Brooks v. State, 
1979).  The trial was approximately 40 minutes in length and 
included: a summary of the guilt phase, a victim impact statement, 
closing arguments by the prosecuting and defense attorneys, and 
judges' instructions. The victim impact statement was taken from 
the sentencing phase of the capital trial of Napoleon Beazley 
(Beazley v. State, 1997). Napoleon Beazley was found guilty of the 
first degree murder of John Luttig. During the sentencing phase, 
Michael Luttig, the decedent’s son and an appeals court judge, 
gave a victim impact statement to the jury prior to sentencing. We 
edited the statement as delivered by the victim’s mother; a more 
suitable fit with the Brooks case. Actors from a local theatre played 
the roles of attorneys, judge, and the mother of the victim.   
 
In the guilt phase summary, the judge stated the defendant 
was convicted on charges of kidnapping, armed robbery, rape, and 
first degree murder.  The judge then informed participant-jurors 
that they would hear testimony provided by the victim's mother 
and decide which penalty was appropriate for this crime. The 
mother of the victim provided the victim impact statement which 
lasted approximately 8 minutes.  The victim impact statement 
described the effects of the crime on the victim’s mother and 
family. Participants in the high emotion victim impact statement 
condition witnessed the mother sobbing while reading the 
statement.  Participants in the low emotion victim impact condition 
witnessed the mother reading the same statement in a calm, fairly 
unaffected manner.  Participants in the control condition viewed 
each aspect of the trial minus the victim impact statement. In order 
to maintain the ecological validity of our study, participants who 
were not exposed to the victim impact statement did not respond to 
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measures assessing various aspects of the statement (i.e., 
emotionality and importance on reaching verdict).  
 
In his closing argument, the prosecuting attorney argued 
that jurors should sentence the defendant to death.  In contrast, the 
defense attorney’s closing argument asked jurors for leniency and 
to spare the defendant's life.  Participants in the victim impact 
instruction condition heard the standard judge’s instructions along 
with specific victim impact instructions stating that, inter alia, 
victim impact statements can never serve as the basis for making a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty. The specific victim impact 
instructions used in our study were prepared by a Maryland public 
defender (O’Donnell, 1997) and submitted to the Court as 
proposed instructions in a death penalty case. The standard judge’s 
instructions were taken verbatim from the Brooks trial. See 
Appendix for the specific victim impact instructions.  
 
After viewing the videotaped simulated trial, jurors 
responded to a number of demographic items including: gender, 
age, ethnicity, political affiliation, and previous experience as a 
juror in a criminal or civil proceeding. In addition, participants 
were asked whether or not they agreed that sympathy for the 
victim, victim’s family, and defendant should be taken into 
consideration when deciding sentence (0 = completely disagree to 
7 = completely agree). Participants were asked whether their views 
of the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their 
ability to follow the judge’s instructions in the case (Wainwright v. 
Witt, 1985). This standard is referred to as “death qualification” 
and is used to ensure that prospective jurors are able to consider 
the death penalty. The primary dependent variable was sentence 
recommendation for the defendant measured dichotomously (life 
imprisonment vs. death by lethal injection).  
 
Design and Procedure 
Our study investigated the combined effects of emotional 
victim impact testimony and judge’s instructions on capital 
sentencing decisions as a 2 (Instruction type:  general vs. general 
and specific victim impact instructions) X 3 (Emotionality of 
victim impact statement: high vs. low vs. none) between subjects 
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factorial design.  Participants were tested in groups ranging in size 
from 10 to 28. They were instructed to read all the materials 
carefully because they would be serving as participant-jurors in the 
death penalty phase of a capital trial.  Upon obtaining informed 
consent, participants viewed the 40-minute videotape and 
responded to a 45-item questionnaire assessing: demographics, 
sentence recommendation, victim and defendant attitude items, and 
perceptions of the victim impact statements. The entire study took 
one hour.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Checks 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if 
participants in the high emotion condition perceived the victim 
impact statement as significantly more emotional than the low 
emotion condition. Results indicated the manipulation was 
effective: F(1, 88) = 22.90, p = .000: (Ms = 5.58 vs. 3.23, 
respectively). Ratings were made on a scale of 1 = not at all 
emotional to 6 = very emotional. In addition, participants in the 
specific instruction condition rated victim impact instructions as 
significantly more useful (1 = not at all useful to 6 = very useful) in 
understanding victim impact evidence compared to participants in 
the general instruction condition: F(1, 127) = 18.75, p = .000: (Ms 
= 3.86 and 2.56), demonstrating the effectiveness of the instruction 
manipulation.   
 
Witt Removals 
Thirty-seven jurors (22%) indicated their views on the 
death penalty would either prevent or substantially impair their 
ability to consider both penalties (Wainwright v. Witt, 1985).  A 
chi-square test of independence revealed a significant association 
between sentencing recommendation and participant-jurors 
identified as Witt: χ2 (1, N = 166) = 15.41, p = .000. Twenty-four 
of 37 (65%), were significantly more likely to recommend life 
compared to death (n = 13, 35%). Data were removed from further 
analyses for those jurors identified as Witt.  
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Sentence Recommendation 
 A log-linear analysis revealed a significant instruction by 
sentence (IV – DV) association: χ2 (1, N = 129) = 7.53, p = .006. Of 
38 participant-jurors who recommended life, 25 (66%) heard both 
general and specific instructions, compared to 13 (34%) who heard 
general instructions. Conversely, of 91 participant-jurors who 
recommended death, 55 (60%) heard general instructions, compared 
to 36 (40%) who heard specific instructions. There was no significant 
effect of emotionality of victim impact statement on sentence 
recommendation, nor was there a significant emotion * instruction 
interaction. 
 
 Participant-jurors who recommended life (n = 38), were not 
significantly different from those who recommended death (n = 91) 
with respect to gender, political views, and familiarity with law 
enforcement. All participants reportedly took their roles as jurors 
seriously (M = 5.57, on a scale of 1 = not at all serious to 6 = 
completely serious).  
 
Reliability Analysis 
Participant-jurors who heard victim impact statements rated 
the eight statements made by the victim’s mother during her 
testimony. Ratings were made on 8-point scales (0= not at all 
important in reaching my decision to 7 = completely important in 
reaching my decision). As Table 1 indicates, the means on the 
statements ranged from 4.97 to 5.59 for our entire sample. The 
eight statements revealed inter-item correlations ranging from .30 
to .83, p < .001 (one-tailed).  Cronbach’s alpha indicated that the 
eight statements were internally consistent, α = .91. Based on this 
result, we combined the items to form the “Victim Impact 
Statement Importance Scale” (VISIS). Scores on the scale were 
computed across the 89 participants who heard the victim impact 
statements. There was a significant difference between jurors who 
recommended life vs. those who recommended death on VISIS: 
t(87) = -2.57, p = .012 (Ms = 38.00 v. 44.40, respectively).  Jurors 
who voted for death rated the statements as significantly more 
important in their decision compared to those who voted for life.  
Instructions as a Moderator of VIS Importance 
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 To examine whether instructions moderated the relation 
between emotionality and participants’ ratings of the eight 
statements, we conducted a 2 (Instruction type:  general vs. general 
and specific victim impact instructions) X 2 (Emotionality of 
victim impact statement: high vs. low) between subjects factorial 
design.  We found a significant instruction * emotion interaction 
on VIS Importance: F(1, 85) = 4.28, p = .04; ή2 = .05. Specific 
instructions significantly lessened overall importance of the 
statements in the high emotion condition, compared to general 
instructions. In addition, we found a significant main effect of 
instruction: F(1, 85) = 7.72, p = .007.  Participant-jurors in the 
specific instruction condition rated the importance of statements 
lower compared to participant-jurors exposed to general 
instructions: (Ms = 39.21 and 45.48 for specific vs. general 
instructions, respectively). Table 2 displays the interaction means 
of this analysis. 
 
 A significant positive relationship was found between 
overall importance of statements in death penalty recommendation 
and: the amount of suffering participants felt the victim 
experienced: r = .41, compassion for the victim: r = .32, and 
compassion for surviving family members: r = .31. All correlations 
were significant at p = .000.  
 
Life vs. Death Attitudes 
Participant-jurors recommending life reported significantly 
different attitudes toward the defendant compared to those who 
recommended death. Table 3 displays the differences in attitudes 
toward the defendant as a function of life vs. death sentence 
recommendation. More favorable attitudes toward the defendant 
were reported by participant-jurors who recommended life 
compared to those who recommended death. Participant-jurors 
who recommended death rated six of the eight statements read by 
the victim’s mother as significantly more important in reaching 
their decision compared to those who recommended life.  Table 4 
displays these differences.   
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DISCUSSION 
 
 Overall, we obtained partial support for our moderating 
hypotheses. While we did not find that victim impact instructions 
reduced the influence of emotion on sentence recommendation 
(Baron & Kenney, 1986), we did find a moderating effect of 
instruction on participants’ perceptions of the victim impact 
testimony. After hearing specific instructions, participant-jurors in 
the high emotion condition rated the eight statements as 
significantly less important in reaching their decision, compared to 
those who heard general instructions. The introduction of 
instructions specifically tailored to organizing and applying this 
type of evidence apparently reduced the affective significance of 
victim impact statements. Additionally, exposure to specific victim 
impact instructions resulted in an overall increase in life sentences, 
and a decrease in death sentences.  These findings provide a 
baseline of empirical support for defense attorneys’ contention that 
properly worded victim impact instructions can serve as an 
effective safeguard in capital trials when victim impact evidence is 
presented (Castellano, 1996).  
 
Consistent with McGowan and Myers (2004), participants 
in our study did not differ in sentence recommendation as a 
function of level of emotion. Highly emotional statements 
appeared to have the same affect on sentence recommendation as 
less emotional statements. The victim impact evidence in the 
present study was based on an actual statement written and 
presented by a federal appeals court judge whose father was 
murdered in a carjacking (Beazley v. State, 1997). As a result, the 
victim impact statement was powerful, articulate, and persuasive.  
Given the magnitude of the victim impact evidence in the present 
study, we may have unknowingly mirrored Justice Powell’s 
concerns when writing for the majority in Booth.  Specifically, 
Justice Powell stated that admitting victim impact evidence in a 
capital sentencing hearing “creates a constitutionally unacceptable 
risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner” (p. 2536). In our study, the strength and 
articulation of the statement may have overshadowed any 
distinguishable differences in level of emotion when determining 
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sentence. The type of statement chosen for our study may also 
explain why we did not find a moderating effect of victim impact 
instructions on verdict. Perhaps instructions are most effective 
when limits are placed on the type and manner in which victim 
impact evidence is presented in capital sentencing hearings (Burr, 
2003; Myers & Greene, 2004).  
 
 It is important to point out that the magnitude of 
participant-jurors’ responses to various victim issues in this type of 
research study can be exaggerated due to the limited amount of 
trial information made available to them. This type of problem is 
not atypical in laboratory research simulating complex trial 
procedures. In our study, we attempted to minimize this problem 
by using a number of ecologically valid materials including: a 
victim impact statement, closing arguments, and judge’s 
instructions taken from actual cases. In addition, we utilized 
videotaped stimuli, which are accepted as the standard for realistic 
trial simulations compared to written transcripts and audio 
presentation.  Although we are confident that our approach to 
examining this topic drew on the strengths of both internal and 
external validity, we echo other researchers’ concerns regarding 
generalizing results involving life and death decisions (Myers & 
Greene, 2004). The value of this study is the insight offered into 
the use of instructions as a procedural safeguard in minimizing the 
effect of emotionality in capital trials. 
 
 To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine victim 
impact instructions as a procedural safeguard in capital sentencing 
decisions.  Since the Payne decision, procedural safeguards in 
cases involving victim impact testimony have generally been in the 
form of restrictions; i.e., the type of allowable witnesses providing 
testimony (Wesley v. State, 1996), the form of the testimony (U.S. 
v. McVeigh, 1997), or the amount of time allowed to deliver a 
victim impact statement (State v. Biechele, 2005). There is little 
empirical evidence that these types of safeguards remove the 
possibility that victim impact statements are unduly prejudicial 
(Greene, 1999; Greene, et al., 1998).  The decision-making process 
in a capital trial should be guided by a reasoned assessment of the 
magnitude of the defendant’s actions. Victim impact testimony 
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makes this assessment much more difficult to achieve. Victim 
impact instructions have the potential to minimize the risk to 
decision-making caused by emotional victim impact testimony. 
Future studies are needed to address the differential effects of the 
various safeguards imposed in cases involving victim impact 
evidence.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Victim Impact Instructions 
During the course of this proceeding, you have heard 
evidence which pertains to the personal characteristics of the 
victim, and you have heard evidence which pertains to the impact 
of the victim’s death on her family and community.  This evidence 
is referred to as victim impact evidence and is intended to show 
each victim’s uniqueness as a human being and the impact of her 
loss upon her family.  This evidence should be given whatever 
weight you feel it deserves, in accordance with the law and 
pursuant to my instructions, in determining whether to impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment or death.  I instruct you, however, 
that victim impact evidence can never serve as the basis for 
making a defendant eligible for the death penalty.  This evidence is 
not to be considered by you as an aggravating circumstance - as a 
reason to impose the death penalty.  No matter how emotionally 
compelling you have found this evidence to be, you are instructed 
that you may not consider evidence concerning the personal 
characteristics or impact of the victim’s death on her family or 
community during the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. When weighing aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances you may only consider those aggravating 
circumstances, if any, which you have unanimously found proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and those mitigating circumstances, if 
any, which you have found proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  During this process, you may not consider any evidence 
which pertains to the personal characteristics or the impact of the 
victim’s death on her family or community.  If you determine 
during the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances, then you will enter a sentence of life imprisonment.  
It is only in accordance with these instructions that you may 
consider victim impact evidence in your determination of the 
appropriate sentence in this case. 
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Table 1 
Mean Importance of Eight Victim Impact Statements Read by Victim’s Mother 
(N=89). 
Statement                Overall Mean_ 
“…watching the re-enactment of her murder on television.” 4.97 
“…wondering what those final moments must have been like.” 5.26 
“…living with the horror, agony, despair, emptiness, confusion.” 5.14 
“…hearing your daughter’s body has just been found.” 5.26 
“…hearing the autopsy report of this grotesque crime.” 5.51 
“…living the rest of your life with these horrible facts.” 5.38 
“…a strange man in your driveway with a gun.” 5.59 
“…hearing your daughter has been gunned down.” 5.35 
______________________________________________________ 
Note:  Ratings were made on 8-point scales (0= not at all important in reaching 
my decision to 7 = completely important in reaching my decision).   
Each statement was prefaced with the word: “Imagine….”  
 
Table 2 
Mean VIS Importance Score by Emotion and Instruction (N=89). 
    Emotionality
Instructions     High              Low  
General 48.68 42.27 
General + Specific 37.75 40.67 
_____________________________________________________ 
Note. Higher scores indicated greater importance placed on the eight statements 
in reaching their decision. Maximum Importance Score = 56.00. Range = 54.00,  
Mean = 42.53, Median = 44.00. 
 
Table 3 
Attitude Differences as a Function of Sentence Recommendation 
___________________________________________________________  
                                                                      Sentence recommendation 
     Lifea  Deathb 
Attitude item 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
I feel sympathy for the defendant.  3.53  2.19 
I feel the defendant is dangerous.  4.94  5.83 
I feel the defendant could be rehabilitated. 3.00  1.58 
I favored the defense closing argument.* 4.58  3.91 
___________________________________________________________ 
Note. Ratings were made on 8-point scales (0=completely agree to 7 = 
completely disagree).  
an = 38. bn = 91. 
*p < .05. The three remaining mean differences significant at p < .01. 
© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2006, 2(2) 
 
PLATANIA & BERMAN  101 
Table 4 
Importance of Statements as a Function of Sentence Recommendation (N=89). 
 
               Sentence recommendation 
         
         Lifea  Deathb 
Statement 
“. . . living with the horror, agony, despair….”*    4.48  5.41 
“. . . hearing your daughter’s body has just      4.29  5.67 
been found.”**  
“. . . hearing your daughter has been gunned down.”*    4.81  5.58 
“. . . seeing the re-enactment of the murder on TV.”**   4.14  5.33 
“. . . what the final moments must have been like.”**    4.59  5.54 
“. . . hearing the autopsy report.”*      5.00  5.73 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Note.  an = 27. bn = 62. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
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